Mr. President, I wish

to continue a series of remarks that I

have placed before the Senate in the

past several weeks regarding the increasing

problems relating to Kosovo.

Together, with other Senators, I have

tried to avail myself of every opportunity

to learn about this situation.

Just weeks ago, I made a trip myself

into the region, accompanied by two

outstanding ambassadors, Miles and

Hill, and had an opportunity to get

firsthand impressions. My trip included

Bosnia, Belgrade, Macedonia, and

Kosovo.

Those impressions, together with

many years of really hard work studying

the Balkan region, having first

gone, in September 1992, into Sarajevo,

I have even greater concern today

about the implications of the problems

unfolding in Kosovo and the necessity

for the world to respond to stop the

tragic killing that is taking place

every day.

I commend the majority leader—indeed,

I am sure there are others who

have worked diligently on this—but he

has, in this busiest of all weeks of the

year in the Senate, found time to convene

in his office and otherwise meet

with people—and I have joined him on

several occasions—about this situation.

Indeed, a few days ago a group of

us sent a letter to the President of the

United States expressing our concerns.

This was a letter that followed the

briefing by the Secretaries of State and

Defense, with the National Security

Adviser and the Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs.

Mr. President, I will address particular

parts of that letter to the President

and his response. The response was

quite comprehensive.

Further today, I, and I am sure other

Members of the Senate, have received

drafts of proposed resolutions put forth

by a Member on that side of the aisle

and a Member on this side of the aisle.

Given that they are drafts, and I don’t

know what the ultimate intention of

the drafters will be, I will not identify

the persons who distributed the drafts

as a senatorial courtesy, but I would

like to address my concerns relevant to

both drafts.

The purpose today is, again, to give

my personal views regarding the plan

of operation that has been laid before

us publicly by this administration, by

the NATO commanders and, indeed, by

one or more of our allies, notably

Great Britain.

I commend their Minister for National

Security and Defense. He has

spoken most forthrightly. Indeed, I

think his views closely match my own,

and that is, any planning to go forward

to correct the problems that exist in

Kosovo today has to be, in my judgment,

and in his, twofold—ground as

well as air.

One, a very decisive series of airstrikes,

which I support. I believe, and

others believe, that a necessary second

component of any military action, to

back up the airstrikes, has to be the

quick placement of a stabilization

ground force into Kosovo, into the region,

primarily the capital, Pristina. If

that is not done, Mr. President, the

goals of the airstrikes can not have

been fulfilled in my opinion.

In my judgment, the predominant

number of military units involved in

that airstrike would be American, because

of our specialized aircraft and

air-to-ground precision ordinance. Our

Allies in NATO will provide other important

air assets. I think in order to

consolidate the gains that we can anticipate

from those air strikes, a stabilization

force has to be put in place

on the ground.

The main urgency of the moment—is

some approximately quarter of a million

Kosovars, Albanians who have

been driven from their homes and villages

into the hills who are confronting

now another enemy. Once it was the

Milosevic police, the Milosevic regular

army, but now it is weather that is

forcing these tragic people to endure

conditions which will be severely injurious

to their health and safety.

Food, medicine, and shelter must be

brought in beginning immediately, to

alleviate that crisis. And secondly, we

want to have a cessation to the conflicts

that have gone on between these

peoples for these many months which

have resulted in some 2,000-plus deaths,

largely again suffered by the Albanians,

the 90 percent of the population.

But, indeed, there are incidents where

the KLA, the insurgent forces within

the Albanian population, have got to

answer, themselves, for their responsibility

for certain tragic killings of

Serbs in this area. There are not clean

hands on either side.

But again, to summarize the objectives:

Get immediate relief in for these

refugees; and, secondly, stabilize the

fighting among the minority Serbians

and the majority Albanians.

If that is not done, if that stabilization

force is not quickly put in, this

situation could even escalate in terms

of the killing, because you will have removed

that military force, i.e., the

Serbian paramilitary police, and indeed

the regular army, and the remnants

that will be left of the Serbian

people, such police that are left, will

then be faced with the preponderance

of a 90 percent ethnic Albanian population

coming down out of the hills.

And I doubt that they will come down

and shake hands with their former Serbian

neighbors—finding their homes

ravaged, destroyed, their livestock

killed, their fields burned. It will not

be, Mr. President, a very peaceful setting

once the air seals off the flow of

heavy armaments and military down

from Belgrade.

Mr. President, herein is the problem

as I see it. Our administration, regrettably—

and I will refer to their letter

momentarily—regrettably, has evaded,

in my judgment, a full debate on the

issue of the need for a stabilization

force. They have focused the public attention

in our country solely on the

need for an airstrike, leaving out what

I think should be responsible dialogue,

beginning with the President and the

Secretaries of State and Defense, on

the need for a stabilization force.

Yesterday, I met with a senior officer

from NATO, together with other Senators,

and he clearly understood the

necessity for that stabilization force.

Indeed, I happen to know firsthand

NATO has studied the need for it.

NATO has contingency plans to address

that. The plans range all the way from

taking the indigenous KDOM, which is

a very interesting creation in this conflict—

it is a combination of military

people from the United States, Canada,

and certain other European nations,

and indeed I think some Russians, together

with diplomatic officials from

those nations who go out into this region,

unarmed, for the purpose of reporting

back on what is taking place in

terms of the ravaging of the countryside,

the condition of those who have

been driven into the hills. And it has

been a very valuable source of information

for the free world to have had the

reports of KDOM. I traveled with them;

they are a brave lot.

One option is to enlarge the KDOM.

But again, KDOM is not there for military

purposes. They are not trained as

policemen. They are not trained as security

forces. The individual military

officers may have some training, but

certainly by design and in terms of the

logistic equipment, and the like, they

are not prepared, in my judgment, to

take on the potential parameters of

conflicts that could break out following

air strikes.

Next it is thought that one or more

organizations, like the O.S.C.E. in Europe,

could come in and take over this

situation to provide a stabilizing force.

But that organization has no history.

It has no history of taking on an operation

of this magnitude. It has no

logistical support. It has no experience

in coordinating, bringing in troops

from other countries.

And so after dialogue with our guests

yesterday, and dialogue with many

others, it is my judgment that only

NATO can provide such stabilization

force as will be necessary in the immediate

aftermath of a series of airstrikes—

I repeat that—only NATO. I

believe it unwise for the Administration

now to rule out U.S. ground forces

as being a part of a stabilization force

composed of several NATO members.

When we had the Secretary of Defense

before the Armed Services Committee

the other day, regrettably, he

did not respond with the precision I

would have liked regarding U.S. participation.

Indeed, I think the record

reflects statements to the effect that

there will be no U.S. participation

should a ground element for stabilization

be necessary.

Mr. President, I do not think that we

should embark—I want to repeat that—

I do not think we should embark on

these airstrikes without a resolution of

how that stabilization force is to be

constituted and whether or not the

United States will be a part of that

force, because we will have started a

situation of hitting a sovereign country.

We have done that twice already

here in the past month or two—hitting

a sovereign nation with predominantly

U.S. air assets—with really no clear

understanding of what is going to take

place immediately afterwards on the

ground in Kosovo.

We talk about a peace settlement.

All of us would like to have a peace

settlement, but I cannot believe that if

you inflict severe air damage of the

magnitude it will take to bring

Milosevic, the principal wrongdoer in

this whole situation—the principal

wrongdoer for years and years, beginning

back in Bosnia —you cannot suddenly

expect him to come to the negotiating

table in a matter of days. And

it is within those days that the instability

could grow in the Kosovo region.

That is my concern.

This instability could spread over

into Albania, which is already torn by

civil strife. Refugees could begin to

flow into Montenegro. Montenegro is

now burdened, heavily burdened, with

refugees from Albania. More refugees

into Macedonia. This whole region

could be destabilized unless a stabilization

force is put into Kosovo in a timely

way.

And further, in my judgment, the

work that we have done, together with

our allies over many years, to secure

Bosnia, to the extent we achieved any

results there—certainly relative peace

compared to the war of several years

ago—that could well be undermined,

because if the insurgents down in

Kosovo are not contained, that will

spread into Bosnia and begin to undo

what we have achieved, what little we

have achieved thus far, toward the implementation

of the Dayton accords.

So my purpose in addressing Kosovo,

again, is twofold. These resolutions in

draft form call for only U.S. participation

in airstrikes. I mean, it is very

clearly laid out in both these resolutions.

One of them states that: Whereas

the Secretary of Defense, William

Cohen, opposes the deployment of

ground forces in Kosovo, as reflected in

his testimony before Congress on October

6, and clearly says that while we

support the use of air, it will be air,

and air alone.

That I think is an unwise position for

the U.S. to take.

Let me give you an example. Should

it be the consensus of NATO that you

have to bring a NATO ground force

into Kosovo for stabilization, which is

my judgment, and you plant the NATO

flag, and the U.S. flag is not on the

staff, we are not represented there, the

question arises why? I mean, we bring

into question, who is the commander in

chief of NATO? It is an American officer.

An American officer is to command

of a stabilization force put into a

hostile region, and there is not a single

additional American there in that

force! We should not take that position

now.

I fought for many years placing the

ground troops in Bosnia. Year after

year I voted against it. It was only on

the last vote where I joined Senator

Dole that I relented. I had no desire to

see Americans go in there. I questioned,

in some way, the vital security

interests. But that s history; we are on

the ground in Bosnia and our troops,

with other SFOR elements are working

to secure a lasting peace. NATO’s

credibility is on the line now in

Kosovo, for only a credible threat to

use force can move settlement talks in

Belgrade.

If NATO leaders, upon failure of diplomacy,

launch a NATO air operation,

the credibility of NATO is on the line.

I think you should not start the air

until we have fully answered the question:

How do you secure the benefits

flowing from the air operation and stabilize

that region until the negotiators

can come to the table and work out a

cease fire.

The other resolution being circulated

today, likewise, calls solely for air,

very explicitly. It has another provision

in here which troubles me a great

deal; that is, you can only use air for 6

months unless there is further consideration

by the Congress.

Mr. President, we have known for a

long time that setting deadlines with

regard to troops just does not work.

Therefore, the placing of a deadline in

connection with the use of air and limiting

it to 6 months, to me, is not a

wise way to proceed. Therefore, I have

indicated I would not participate; indeed,

I would vote against either of

these resolutions should they come

back in this form. Both resolutions

limit the U.S. participation to air. The

President is authorized to use the U.S.

Armed Forces for the purpose only of

conducting air operations and missile

strikes against the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia.

Again, you cannot plan an air operation

without a concomitant means to

secure the ground.

Let me pose the hypothetical: Suppose

you strike with air and you are

successful in destroying certain targets,

then is Milosevic likely to sit

there and do nothing? He could counterattack.

His only means of counterattack,

in all probability, given his air

capability is largely destroyed, his

naval capability is hopefully bottled up

in the caves or elsewhere, his only avenue

to retaliate would be on the

ground; perhaps, once again, send out

his column of tanks and his column of

heavy artillery. Bad weather and darkness

of night travel could inhibit air

operations.

Air could interdict, I am sure, much

of it, but it might require a ground

force at some point to interdict such

actions as may be taken in retaliation

by Milosevic.

I urge the Senate to be very, very

cautious as we proceed. I hope to continue

our debate with other Senators

here as it relates to this situation.

I turn to the response of the President.

As I said, it contained specific responses.

This is the President speaking.

On page 4 he states:

Now, to me, that is just faulty planning.

I do support the use of force to stop

the killing, to enable the NGOs and

others to have an environment into

which they can bring supplies to help

these people. I do not give my support

unless a convincing argument is put

forth about a stabilizing force and the

need to have that force in order to secure

the Kosovo region.

We have to be very careful that the

credibility of NATO is protected. It is

on the line. We cannot allow the NATO

force to be considered as acting in concert

with the KLA. That is a tough

call. Try and find a KLA leader. They

are difficult to find. I am not talking

about Rugova in Pristina. He has been

accessible to all. These militants, the

heads of the KLA troops, in this area of

Kosovo are not well defined, not well

known, and not well coordinated. It is

a problem to contain them once we

begin to use our air. We cannot seem to

be coming in here with a military hand

to support Kosovo gaining independence

from the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. That is not our goal.

Again, only a ground force containing

this situation in Kosovo, until such

time as a settlement can be worked out

at the table, is the only way, in my

judgment, that this matter can be resolved.

I hope other Senators will come forward

and give their views because this

could break in military action any day

now. I don’t predict in any way when

the strike may begin. Hopefully, diplomatic

efforts, which are still ongoing,

can prevent the necessity of the use of

force. It is only that credible determination

to use force, as perceived in

Belgrade, that will bring about successful

diplomatic negotiations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent

to have the letter to the President

and his response to the majority leader,

which I referred to earlier, printed

in the RECORD.